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Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Denial of the Franchise to Indi-
viduals with Criminal Records
In 1961 Robert A. Stephens, a resident of New Jersey, was con-
victed of larceny ofdan automobile in the County Court of Essex County,
New Jersey. He received a sentence of probation for three years. On
May 27, 1968, Mr. Stephens registered as a voter with the Essex County
Board of Elections and was thereafter notified that his name had been
stricken from the voting lists because of his prior conviction for larceny.
Election officials acted under a 1948 New Jersey statute' that provided
for the automatic loss of voting rights of those convicted of various and
sundry crimes.
Desiring to vote and otherwise qualified to vote in the November
3, 1970, general election for federal and state candidates, Stephens
brought an action before a three-judge district court seeking an injunc-
tion restraining the Superintendent of Elections of New Jersey from
enforcing the statute. He argued that his disenfranchisement deprived
him of the equal protection of the laws.
In Stephens v. Yeomans 2 the three-judge court held that state voter
qualification laws were indeed covered by the fourteenth amendment
and that to pass muster under the equal protection clause all state laws
disenfranchising resident citizens must bear a rational relationship to
the achievement of a discernible and permissible state goal.3 The court
determined that the purpose of the New Jersey Legislature in passing
the statute was to insure and preserve the purity of the state electoral
process. This determination was based on the facts that the New Jersey
Legislature derived the power to pass this specific statute from language
'N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (1964) provides: "No one shall have the right of suffrage-
(4) Who shall hereafter be convicted of the crime of larceny of the value of $200.00 or more, unless
pardoned or restored by law to the right of suffrage ....
2327 F. Supp. 1182 (D.N.J. 1970).
VId. at 1187. Although the court purported to be utilizing the rigorous equal protection test
demanded when a fundamental right is involved, see. e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), it
couched the standard in terms of the traditional and more lenient test, see, e.g., McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). Thus it required only a "rational relationship" between the
avowed state purpose and the legislation instead of a showing of a "compelling state interest" in
it. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See generally Cox, Foreword
to The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 94-95 (1967).
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in the state constitutional article on suffrage4 and that the statute itself
was located in the title on elections. Finding no rational relationship
between the crimes conviction of which would disqualify and the state's
purpose of protecting the ballot box, the court struck down the statute
as unconstitutional for not meeting the "exacting standard of precision
required by the equal protection clause for a selective distribution of the
franchise." '5 The Superintendent of Elections was then ordered to restore
plaintiff's name to the voter list in time to vote in the next general
election.
The Stephens court, in basing its holding on the fourteenth amend-
ment, pointed out the disagreement among constitutional scholars as to
the applicability of the equal protection clause to state voter qualifica-
tion laws. The equal protection clause is contained in the first section
of the fourteenth amendment and does not specifically mention voting
rights.6 On the other hand, the second section of the fourteenth amend-
ment speaks expressly to protection of voting rights.7 Since these two
sections were obviously passed simultaneously, the argument exists that
only the second section was intended to pertain to state voting laws.8
Justice Harlan has recently articulated this argument, and interpreta-
tions contemporaneous with the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
lend strong support to his position.'
However, as the Stephens court noted, this view is not currently
accepted by the Supreme Court." In fact, the Court has often used the
equal protection clause in its attempts to eliminate voter discrimination
'Article 2, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides: "The Legislature may pass
laws to deprive persons of the right of suffrage who shall be convicted of such crimes as it may
designate. Any person so deprived, when pardoned or otherwise designate. Any person so deprived,
when pardoned or otherwise restored by law to the right of suffrage, shall again enjoy that right."
5327 F. Supp. at 1188.
'U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I: "No state shall. . . deny to any person within itsjurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."
'U.S. Co sr. amend. XIV, § 2:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respec-
tive numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote . . .[in certain elections] is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
'See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'ld. at 626-631.
"See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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based upon race," wealth,' 2 or place of residence. 3 The main purpose
of the second section is to sanction states' engaging in voter discrimina-
tion by reducing their representation in Congress. Thus, if the second
section were the sole touchstone in the realm of voting rights, then
reduction in representation would be the only possible remedy for depri-
vation of such rights. This unduly restrictive interpretation of remedies
was implicitly rejected by the Supreme Court when it approved a dam-
ages action against Texas election commissioners for violation of the
fourteenth amendment in denying the right to vote because of race. 4
The Stephens court considered this an overwhelming rejection of the
Harlan argument that the second section completely precludes the pro-
tection of voting rights from any other source.
Anticipating this reaction, the New Jersey Superintendent of Elec-
tions argued, as have several state attorneys-general while defending
statutes denying the vote to those convicted of certain crimes, that even
if the first section of the fourteenth amendment applies to state voter
laws, it is nonetheless limited to some extent by the language of the
second section.' The sanction outlined in the second section specifically
exempts the situation in which the franchise is denied participants "in
rebellion or other crime." Since the second section seemingly approves
of this particular discrimination, such discrimination must be beyond
the reach of the equal protection clause as well. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found this argument persuasive in Green v. Board
of Elections, in which a New York statute disenfranchising all felons
was upheld.'s-Judge Friendly, writing for the court, found that the rejec-
tion of Harlan's position by the Supreme Court in no way precluded this
interpretation, "especially in the light of the Justices' frequent and con-
sistent statements approving voting disqualification for felony."' 9 How-
"E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
12E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
'"E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
"Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
'1327 F. Supp. at 1185.
"See, e.g., Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.), affd per curiam, 396 U.S.
12(1969).
7380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
"See generally W. Crumpler, Research Paper on Administration of Criminal Justice, May,
1971 (unpublished paper in possession of author).
"Id. at 452. The Green court, in approving the disqualification of felons, stated, "The framers
of the Amendment . . . could hardly have intended the general language of § I to outlaw a
discrimination which § 2 expressly allowed without the penalty of reduced representation." Id.
However, the court earlier in the opinion had admitted that "[t]here may. . . be crimes. . which
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ever, the Stephens court also rejected this argument, concluding that
since it was "clear that the entire section imposes no limitation on
section 1, it can hardly be argued that the exception or proviso relied
on in Green in section 2 was intended to impose such a limitation."' 0
The court felt that the express exception to the second section in no way
permeated other parts of the Constitution. The framers of the four-
teenth amendment apparently thought the remedy of reduced represen-
tation inappropriate if states denied criminals the right to vote.' To
apply the exception across the board would distort the framers' words
beyond their true meaning.
After so artfully construing the fourteenth amendment, the court
sought the rational link22 between the legislation and its avowedly per-
missible purpose. In examining the reasons the state might have in
disenfranchising convicted criminals, the court ignored the oft-cited one
of additional punishment;23 instead the court concentrated on the pro-
tection of the electoral process, since the actions of the New Jersey
legislature clearly were directed towards this purpose. The preservation
of the purity of the ballot box was first recognized in a frequently quoted
Alabama case, Washingtrn v. State,2 and has been recognized by many
courts as being a valid state consideration.2 5 However, the Stephens
court determined that the New Jersey statute did nothing to enhance the
purity of the process because of a "remarkable contrast in treatment ' 20
of different classes of crime. For example, embezzlers and most defrau-
ders, including persons convicted of income tax fraud, remained eligible
to vote; however, those convicted of larceny were ineligible. Thieves
were disenfranchised but receivers of stolen property were not.2 Such
randomness of disqualification seemed totally "irrational and inconsist-
are of such minor significance that exclusion for their commission might raise . . . a substantial
constitutional question at least if we looked at § I of the Fourteenth Amendment alone." Id. Thus,
Green can fairly be read as holding only that the disqualification of felons'does not deny equal
protection and not that the qualification is exempt from the penumbra of equal protection.
2327 F. Supp. at 1187.
2'1d. at 1185.
221d. at 1187; see note 3 supra.
21See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); State ex ret. Barrett -!. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237,
175 S.W.2d 787 (1943).
2175 Ala. 582 (1884).
21See Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048
(1968); Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966); State ex rel. Barrett
v. Sartorious, 351 Mo. 1237, 175 S.W.2d 787 (1943).




ent" to the court and could not be explained. Though possibly designed
to protect a permissible state purpose, the statute had no rational rela-
tion to the accomplishment of this purpose. 8
As mentioned earlier, a second general reason often given for disen-
franchising those convicted of crime is additional punishment for the
crime. The punishment argument is open to attack on two grounds.
First, most state constitutions do not provide for disfranchisement as
part of permissible state punishment;29 therefore, such an argument
could be attacked as being repugnant to the state constitution. Secondly,
such additional punishment could be attacked as "cruel and unusual"
under the eighth amendment. In Trop v. Dulles,31 the Supreme Court,
though finding citizenship not subject to the general powers of the na-
tional government and therefore not susceptible to divestment under
these powers, said that the eighth amendment would preclude a penal
divestment of citizenship. In dictum, however, the Court dealt the pun-
ishment argument a blow by stating that voter disqualification for con-
viction of crime was nonpenal 3l in nature because its purpose was to
designate a reasonable ground of eligibility for voting.32 Notwithstand-
ing this dictum, an analogy might be constructed between citizenship
and the right to vote that would place the removal of voting rights in
the realm of cruel and unusual punishment if states proceed on the
punishment theory.
The Stephens court seemed to recognize the possible existence of a
legal justification for restriction of the franchise; it did not propose the
outright enfranchisement of all persons with past criminal records.
However, no workable criteria to aid legislatures in drafting statutes
that do not violate the equal protection clause were set forth. If a
standard had been enunciated, perhaps the Stephens court would have
adopted the criteria proposed by the California Supreme Court when it
proclaimed a California statute impermissibly broad if it were inter-
preted as disenfranchising all felons. In Otsuka v. Hite : the California
court said that if a state's purpose is in fact to protect the purity of the
z2Id.
'Contra, DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2.
-356 U.S. 86 (1958).
"Statutes have been considered nonpenal if they impose a disability not to punish, but to
accomplish some other legitimate purpose. Id. at 96.
32But see DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2, which specifically provides that the legislature may deprive
a convicted criminal of the right to vote as further punishment.
164 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
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ballot box, in drafting a statute that will survive close equal protection
scrutiny, a legislature should focus on the nature of the crime itself; it
must determine whether the particular crime is such that one who has
committed it may reasonably be considered a threat to the integrity of
the elective process, and whether disqualification of the convicted per-
son can reasonably be said to assure that he will not defile the electoral
process. In short, disqualifying classifications must focus primarily on
crimes involving a threat to the electoral process. The court concluded
that it would uphold a California constitutional provision 4 only if it
were interpreted as disqualifying as voters those convicted of crimes
involving moral corruption and dishonesty. 35 While Judge Friendly in
Green had placed great weight on the frequent references 3 by the
Supreme Court to disenfranchisement of felons,"1 the Otsuka court
dismissed this as "mere illustrative dicta." 3
As desirable as the Otsuka result might appear, the limitation to
crimes involving dishonesty and moral corruption considers only the
state's interest and not the interest of the disenfranchised. The Supreme
Court, in Williams v. Rhodes,31 felt that "in determining whether or
not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must consider
the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the State
claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged
by the classification."
In applying this balancing formula to state laws disenfranchising
criminals, it is important to examine the validity of the state's reasoning
"sCAL. CONST. art. 11, § I.
-The plaintiff in Otsuka had been convicted during World War II of violating the Selective
Service Act, and the court considered this crime not indicative of the fact that its perpetrator would
be likely to injure the elective process if he were given his suffrage. 64 Cal. 2d at 605, 414 P.2d at
418, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
3'See. e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958).
"For two cases in which the Supreme Court upheld the disenfranchisement of lawbreakers,
see Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 339 (1890) and Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885). The Otsuka
court distinguished these cases from those denying the right to vote because of a prior conviction.
In Murphy and Davis the plaintiffs had been disenfranchised because they were currently practicing
polygamy in violation of statutes forbidding those who did so to vote. The Supreme Court in
Murphy also recognizes this distinction: "The disfranchisement operates upon the existing state
and condition of the person and not upon a past offence . . . . He alone is deprived of his vote
who, when he offers to register, is then in the state and condition of a bigamist or a polygamist,
or is then actually cohabiting with more than one woman." Id. at 43.
164 Cal. 2d at 605, 414 P.2d at 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 291.




in drafting the classification. If a convicted criminal is upon completion
of sentence denied the right to vote it is obviously because the legislature
feels he will be likely to sell his vote or cast it in some dishonest manner.
If such a likelihood is realistic, then it must also be strongly possible
that a convicted criminal will commit other types of election crimes that
have nothing to do with the actual casting of the ballot. Thus even if it
is accepted that an ex-convict is more likely than other voters to vote
dishonestly, denial of the vote makes a very small contribution to the
overall purpose of protecting the ballot box. When balanced against the
fundamental right of each citizen to vote, the conclusion should be in
favor of giving the franchise back to those persons who are returning
to society after having paid their debt.
41
Under this balancing formula it is likely that both New York's
"felony" disqualification and California's limitation to crimes involving
dishonesty and moral corruption might be struck down under the equal
protection clause. It also raises the question of whether any state statute
that disqualifies ex-convicts can pass equal protection muster. One other
possible standard that would disenfranchise only those convicted to
election law violations has been proposed.12 Again, such a standard
might make a small contribution toward preserving the purity of the
process,4 3 but this should be outweighed by a desire of the state to
release its prisoners to society on terms of reasonable trust and confid-
ence.
44
In addition to an interest in the purity of the election process and
an interest in punishing criminals, a state has an interest in rehabilitat-
ing criminals and assimilating them back into society upon their release
from prison. It is doubtful that the state is injured by allowing ex-
convicts to vote, and the restoration of voting rights upon release would
support the rehabilitation of the ex-offender by giving him a greater
feeling of restoration as a full-fledged citizen." Assimilation into society
"F. WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION 354 (1923).
12See Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on States' Power to Disfranchise
Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 297, 315 (1967).
"To disenfranchise only those convicted of election crimes in order to preserve the purity of
the ballot box carries the stigma of additional punishment in that it smacks of the eye for an eye,
tooth for a tooth penalties generally attributed to Old Testament penology. See also Note,
Constitutional Law-Disenfranchisement of Felons-Felon's Challenge to State Law Disfranchis-
ing Felons Held Not to Raise Substantial Federai Question, 3 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L.
REV. 423, 425 (1968).
"F. WINES, supra note 43, at 354.
'IS. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 622 (1963).
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is not promoted by a device for maintaining social and political distance.
If the prisoner is worthy of being released to the community he should
be made to feel that he is ready to rejoin society as a participant and
not as an outsider.46
Though most states do not automatically restore a prisoner's civil
rights upon release, statutes provide for this restoration upon pardon or
completion of a probationary period. The concept of pardoning and
procedures for obtaining it vary from state to state,47 but in any event
unless voting rights and other civil liberties are restored automatically
upon completion of sentence, the convict faces the degradation of being
without his civil rights at least for a time after having paid his debt to
society.
48
Decisions like Stephens go a long way toward extending full equal
11E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 651-52 (7th ed. 1966).
J'Tappan, Loss and Restoration of Civil Rights of Offenders, 1952 NAT'L PROBATION &
PAROLE Ass'N YEARBOOK 86, 97.
-'North Carolina provides for disenfranchisement in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55 (1972):
The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to register or vote in this State:
(3) Persons who have been convicted, or who have confessed their guilt in open
court, upon indictment, of any crime the punishment for which is now or may
hereafter be imprisonment in the State's prison, unless he shall have had his rights
of citizenship restored in the manner prescribed by law.
North Carolina statutes dealing with restoration of citizenship are found in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-
I to -3 (1972):
§ 13.1. Restoration of citizenship.-Any person convicted of a crime, whereby the
rights of citizenship are forfeited, shall have such rights restored upon compliance with
one of the following conditions:
(I) The Department of Correction at the time of release recommends restora-
tion of citizenship;
(2) Two years have elapsed since release by the Department of Correction,
including probation or parole, during which time the individual has not been
convicted of a criminal offense of any state or of the federal government;
(3) Or upon receiving an unconditional pardon.
§ 13-2. Procedure for restoration.-The restoration procedure shall consist of the
taking of an oath by such person before any judge of the General Court of Justice in
Wake County or in the county where he resides or in which he was last convicted, to
the effect that said person has complied with the provisions of § 13-1, and that he will
support and abide by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the Constitu-
tion and laws of North Carolina not inconsistent therewith.
§ 13-3. Assistance by appropriate government personnel. The Department of
Correction, the Department of Juvenile Correction, the Probation Commission, the
Board of Paroles and other appropriate State and county officials shall cooperate with
and assist such person in securing any information required by any judge prior to
administering the oath required by this section.
[Vol. 50
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protection of the law to those members of society who are stigmatized
by a past criminal convictions. Although the case stopped short of
declaring that all convicted criminals have a right to the franchise after
release and offered no workable standard for legislatures to follow,
standards might be fashioned from the law available in the area. How-
ever, a state can best serve its own interest and at the same time be free
from any possible violation of equal protection by restoring suffrage to
all prisoners upon completion of sentence. The state, of all institutions,
should not let a citizen's conviction of a crime be prima facie evidence
of his electoral dishonesty.
CHARLES H. CRANFORD
Constitutional Law-School Law-Restrictions on the Infliction of Cor-
poral Punishment: Spoiling the Rod
In the past decade courts have begun to recognize the substantive
and procedural constitutional rights of students who attend public
schools' and to attempt to balance those rights against the effective
maintenance of control and discipline in the educational context. For-
merly courts had vested broad discretion in school authorities to control
and discipline students,2 but with the application of constitutional rights
in the school context3 it has become necessary to examine the discipli-
nary procedures of schools, including possible constitutional limitations
upon the infliction of corporal punishment.'
'See generally Note, The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J. 619
(1970); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 358 (1971);
Note, Emerging Rights of High School Students: The Law Comes of Age, 23 U. FLA. L. REV.
549 (1971).
2See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924):
[C]ollege authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may make any regula-
tion . . . which a parent could make . . . and . . . courts have no more authority to
interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his family.
'See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). In Tinker the Supreme Court
held that in the absence of substantial interference with school activities, the wearing of armbands
by students was protected by the first amendment. In the landmark case of Dixon, the Fifth Circuit
held that due process requires notice and some opportunity for a hearing before students can be
expelled for misconduct.
'For the purposes of this note, corporal punishment is defined as the intentional infliction of
physical pain subsequent to misbehavior for the purpose of deterring future misbehavior. It does
not refer to the use of reasonable force as a means of self-defense or for the protection of other
children.
